Drone protection
for your facility

The price depends on how the system detects a drone. A receiver that sees drones broadcasting their position costs several times less than a radar — and does not see everything. Starting figures on this site: a microphone unit — from $1,300, a simple solution with a map — from $1,649, a stand-alone sensor — from $2,399, a sensor that works at the facility around the clock — from $7,500, a kit with a camera — from $15,810.

These are equipment prices. Delivery, design, installation, connection to your cameras and security-staff training are quoted as separate lines. We disclose the manufacturer and model before the order — then the price can be compared with the market. For reference: a European receiver of the same class costs from €3,000, and Chinese portable detectors on export marketplaces run from $300 to $1,000, but these devices differ in composition and verification.

A specification: the manufacturer and exact model of every device, quantity and purpose, declared and calculated detection zone, placement on the site plan, software and subscriptions, power and network requirements. Separately — the cost of equipment, delivery, installation, configuration, training and maintenance.

Before the order we fix what the system must detect: a drone broadcasting its position, a regular control link, the video feed from the drone's camera, an aircraft with no radio link, your own drones. And we agree on acceptance: which test flights we perform, where detection is checked, what counts as a triggered alarm, which limitations remain after installation.

A card on the site describes a class of solution. You receive the manufacturer, full name and specifications before purchase, together with the list and prices.

Before paying, ask for the manufacturer's exact part number, the datasheet, country of origin, certificates, software version, licence terms, warranty and confirmation of the distance at which the device sees a drone. Without this data no offer on the market can be verified — ours included.

Yes, if the task is basic warning and you understand what such a sensor does not see. A simple receiver shows only drones that broadcast their own position. A signal sensor detects known control and video links; an aircraft with no radio exchange passes it by.

A small sensor works as the first layer for patrols, a warehouse, a small facility or monitoring authorised flights. If you expect autonomous or modified aircraft, you need an independent channel: microphones or a radar, and a camera to confirm the target.

A signal sensor will not notice an aircraft that transmits nothing it recognises. This is the main limitation when choosing a system.

For such drones microphones or a radar are installed: microphones hear the propellers, a radar sees the object itself by its reflected signal, whatever the drone transmits. After a radar alarm, a camera or thermal imager confirms that it is a drone. No sensor gives 100% detection: coverage depends on the radar model, the drone's size, hills, obstacles and placement.

It cannot be worked out from the area alone. For such a warehouse, 2–4 sensors is a preliminary guide; the number depends on the shape of the site, building heights, metal structures, neighbouring buildings, radio background, mounting height, the directions to be covered and the chosen technology.

If aircraft with no radio exchange must be detected, the number of signal sensors does not solve the task: microphone nodes every 300–600 m or a radar are needed. The order: site plan → threat model → preliminary placement → coverage check with test flights. We show the number of sensors on the plan before purchase.

They do, and differently. For a signal sensor, buildings and metal change how radio waves propagate and reflect. For a radar, the viewing angle, shielding by structures, hills and the drone itself matter. A visible or thermal camera needs a direct line of sight. A large rated distance does not yet mean continuous coverage of the facility at the same distance.

Sensors are placed after analysing the site, raised above the roof or onto masts and checked with test flights. At a complex industrial facility, several different sensors are usually more useful than one device for every direction.

A difficult radio environment can degrade a signal sensor, but it cannot be assumed in advance that any transformer or electric motor ‘jams’ it. What matters is the actual interference spectrum in the bands the system uses, so we check the installation spot on site.

Before final placement we survey the radio-frequency environment and run a test. If a signal sensor is unreliable in a particular zone, we add an independent channel — microphones or a radar.

It depends on the sensor. A signal sensor needs no light. A radar does not depend on lighting either and is especially useful at night and in poor visibility; manufacturers call it all-weather, but the real distance and recognition accuracy are set by the model, the drone and the conditions.

A regular camera sees worse at night and in fog. A thermal imager shows the target without light, but fog, rain and snow degrade its image too. So the alarm of a critical facility must not depend on a video camera alone.

Sometimes, yes. A PTZ camera is suitable for checking an alarm if the system can receive its video and control pan, tilt and zoom, or show the operator where the target is for manual aiming.

Before the design we check the control protocol, video format, whether it can connect to the software, slew speed, optical zoom, field of view and night capability. An ordinary CCTV camera cannot always track a small, fast aerial target. We add a new camera only where yours is not enough.

It can. A single radar return is not always enough to recognise a small target with confidence. So modern systems look at the trajectory, speed and the characteristic signature of rotating propellers, apply machine recognition, and cross-check a doubtful target with the signal sensor and the camera.

A doubtful alarm is confirmed by a second independent channel. The absence of a radio signal does not mean the target is a bird: an autonomous or silent drone emits nothing either.

Your own aircraft is entered in advance into the trusted list together with its available identifiers, operator, flight time and permitted zone or route. The system keeps showing it on the map but marks it as known and does not raise the same alarm as for an unknown target.

The position a drone broadcasts helps identify it but does not confirm that the flight is agreed: the system receives only the data the aircraft transmits. That is why your own drone goes on the list in advance.

Detection and stopping are different tasks. A signal sensor, a radar and a camera detect, track and confirm the drone. A small critical zone is closed physically — with a net on engineered supports.

Devices that disrupt control, throw off navigation or intercept a drone are a separate category. The result depends on the design of the specific aircraft: it may hover, return, change route or continue the flight. So such devices are installed together with a radar or camera — to see what happened.

First the spots where a drone strike or surveillance costs the most. For a fuel depot these are the tanks, pumping units, transformers and control rooms. For another facility the list comes from its own risk review.

A net is placed over a small critical zone. It is an engineered structure with calculated supports, geometry and fixings; mesh of the right size is only part of it.

Yes. Portable and vehicle-mounted kits are used at construction sites, ports, quarries, events and by mobile security teams. After relocation the system is checked again: a new spot changes the view, shielding by buildings and hills, communications, power and the fields of view of cameras or radar.

There is no single timing. A simple post on a stand — roughly 30–60 minutes. A system with a tall mast, radar, camera, its own network and an acceptance test takes several hours. We quote the exact time for the chosen configuration after the site survey.

At a minimum — a detection sensor, a tablet or laptop with a map, autonomous power and a link to the security post. To confirm the target, a camera with daylight and thermal channels is added; to detect aircraft with no radio link — a mobile radar. In the large version all sensors feed one screen with an event log and a target map.

The composition is set by the threat scenario. Devices that stop a drone are not part of a standard kit: they are selected separately.

No. For a large distributed site we first identify the critical points: the warehouse, fuel facilities, transformer, control centre, loading area, machinery yard. Permanent sensors go there; remote areas are checked with a portable device when needed.

If drones must be seen continuously over the entire site, that is a continuous-coverage calculation that accounts for hills, distances and zone overlap. So we first decide what is needed: protection of individual assets, early warning along the perimeter, or surveillance of the whole area.

A passive signal sensor suppresses nothing: it only receives and analyses signals. A camera does not affect communications either. A radar is an active device and transmits in its own band, so we assess its frequencies and compatibility with your equipment for the specific facility.

A device that disrupts drone control is a separate category: its very purpose is to act on radio channels. It is connected separately and switched on at the guard's command once the drone is confirmed.

Yes, if the equipment supports a local mode. Some solutions work through a cloud service or a paid subscription; in the list we mark which mode each device has.

In the technical specification we fix in advance where the server and database sit, whether external internet is needed, where telemetry and video recordings go, how long events are kept and which external licences are required. Then flights, alarms and recordings stay inside the facility network.